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MIRANDA'S FALL?
Kenji Yoshino*

FALL. By Albert Camus. New York: Vintage Books. 1991
(Justin O'Brien trans., 1956). Pp.147. $9.

THE

I.
If one wishes to revisit a classic, Albert Crunus's The Fall is a risk
ier choice than Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird,1 which Steven
Lubet eloquently discussed last year in these pages.2 It is not only that
Camus's work will be less familiar to legal audiences than Lee's,
despite the fact that The Fall is becoming recognized through critical
"revisitation" as perhaps Crunus's greatest novel.3 It is also that the
legal protagonist of The Fall, Jean-Baptiste Clamence, does not have
Atticus Finch's immediate appeal. Finch is idealistic, Clamence is ex
istential; Finch is pious, Clamence is debauched; Finch is hopeful,
Clamence is mordant; Finch is American, Clamence is French; Finch is
a lawyer, Clamence is an ex-lawyer who is now a judge-penitent.4 In
deed, "the fall" of the title describes Clrunence's fall from being an
idealistic attorney much in the mold of Finch to being the urbane, dis
solute, and strangely knowing expatriate he is at the time he tells his
story. At least regarding the question of whether it is possible to live
greatly in the law, The Fall is a much darker and more disturbing work
than To Kill a Mockingbird. It is a less charismatic classic - a song of
experience rather than one of innocence.

* Associate Professor, Yale Law School. B.A. 1991, Harvard; M.Sc. 1993, Oxford; J.D.
1996, Yale. - Ed. I thank Akhil Amar, Ariela Dubler, and Carol Rose for their helpful
suggestions and Rose Saxe for her research assistance.

1. HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
2. Steven Lubet, Reconstructing Atticus Finch, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1339 (1999) (book re
view).
3. See, e.g., PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND
LITERATURE 163 (2000) (noting that The Fall "has only slowly won recognition as possibly
the greatest of [Camus's] novels"); BRIAN T. FITCH, THE FA LL : A MATIER OF GUILT 8-9
(1995) (noting that, while The Fall is less well-known than Camus's other fiction, it is "his
most successful creation"); ROSEMARIE JONES, CAMUS: L'ETRANGER AND LA CHUTE 91
(1st ed. 2d prtg. 1994) (noting that, in her view, The Fall is Camus's "major work of fiction").
4. The term "judge-penitent" is not a reference to an existing legal role, but one that
describes Clamence's self-conception. Here I follow Clamence, who throws out the term
early in the novel without defining it as a means of encouraging his interlocutor to keep lis
tening for the answer. P. 8. He writes: "What is a judge-penitent? Ah, I intrigued you with
that business." P. 17.
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Yet like many songs of experience, Camus's novel has a polyphony
that simpler stock narratives about the law - or the simpler stock nar
ratives that are the law- do not possess. Clamence is too urbane (to
repeat the adjective that best describes him) to be a lawyer. He has
seen too far into the world, and too deeply into himself, to believe, or
even to pretend to believe, in the particularized determinations of
guilt or innocence that the law requires. His urbanity causes him to
leave his Finch-like career to adopt a hermit-like existence. He shifts
from going to court (p. 17) to holding court in seedy bars (p. 3), from
having many possessions (p. 120) to having little more than steward
ship over a stolen van Eyck painting (p. 128), from arguing other peo
ple's cases (p.3) to ritually confessing his own sins (p.139).
So what can we learn from Clamence's urbanity? In my view, it
most starkly illuminates the nature of confessions. Among literary
characters, Clamence is perhaps unsurpassed in his grasp of what con
fessions mean and how they work. To see this, we might begin by
noting that the entire novel appears to be a monologic confession on
Clamence's part. At the novel's inception, Clamence strikes up a con
versation with a stranger in an Amsterdam bar. That conversation
leads to a series of others over five days, in which Clamence reveals
more and more about himself. While we discern Clamence respond
ing to (and sometimes repeating) the stranger's questions, we never
hear any voice in the novel other than Clamence's own. At the end of
the novel, Clamence tells his interlocutor that he is engaged in ritual
confession (p. 139) - like Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, he finds lis
tener after listener to whom to tell his life story.5
But while Clamence's confession appears monologic, it is actually
dialogic in at least two senses. First, the confession is not the same
confession every time, but is tailored to the listener. "I don't accuse
myself crudely, beating my breast," Clamence says, "No, I navigate
skillfully, multiplying distinctions and digressions, too - in short I
adapt my words to my listener ..." (p. 139). In an important sense,
then, the monologue is guided by the interlocutor, as captured by
commentary that seeks to reconstruct the stranger's half of the con
versation.6 Second, the confession is framed to elicit, and, if we are to
believe Clamence, always does elicit, a counterconfession from the lis
tener. The purpose of tailoring his words to the listener, Clamence re
veals, is to "lead him to go me one better" (p. 139). At one point
during his confession, Clamence says to the stranger: "Search your
memory and perhaps you will find some similar story that you'll tell
me later on" (p. 65). And at the end of the novel, Clamence says to

5. See Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, in THE NORTON
ANTHOLOGY OF POETRY 431, 445 (Margaret Ferguson et al. eds., 4th ed. 1970) (1817).
6. See, e.g., FITCH, supra note 3, at 75-96.
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his interlocutor: "Now I shall wait for you to write me or come back.
For you will come back, I am sure!" (p. 141).
Clamence has a theory for why confessions can be so generative.
Confessions can elicit counterconfessions because everyone is guilty,
because everyone has something to confess (p. 110). This insight en
ables an artful individual making a confession to "construct a portrait
which is the image of all and of no one" (p. 139). When such a portrait
of guilt is painted, it pricks the conscience of others who recognize
themselves within it - in Clamence's words, "the portrait I hold out
to my contemporaries becomes a mirror" (p. 140). That conscience
seeks absolution in a confession of its own, which may in turn stimu
late other confessions. The strange fecundity of confessions reflects
the universality of the guilt that prompts them.
This urbane view of confessions suggests why Clamence left the le
gal profession. In the law, confessions are not meant to demonstrate
universal guilt. To the contrary, the confession is meant to demon
strate that only the confessant (the individual making the confession)
is guilty. A confession by one suspect is usually seen to exonerate,
rather than to implicate, the others. Just as the urbane view situates
the confession within a generalizing discourse of guilt (the confession
shows that all are guilty), the legal view situates the confession within
a particularizing discourse of guilt (the confession shows that some,
but not others, are guilty). An actor as fully committed to the urbane
view as Clamence will have difficulty remaining a traditional legal ac
tor.
Short of following in Clamence's footsteps and leaving the law,
what might a legal audience do with the urbane understanding of the
confession? In this Review, I first more fully describe the urbane view
by engaging in a close reading of Camus's novel. I then draw on Peter
Brooks's recent groundbreaking book, Troubling Confessions:
Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature,1 to consider the difficulties that
the law has in incorporating the urbane view. In so doing, I turn to a
classic text - the Miranda8 warning - that the Supreme Court just
"revisited" this Term,9 to argue that the Miranda warning is a legal at
tempt to contend with the urbane view.
II.
The state of grace from which Jean-Baptiste Clamence falls is not
so different from that imaginatively occupied by Atticus Finch.
Clamence tells his interlocutor that only a few years before their con-

7. BROOKS, supra note 3.
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
9. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 {2000).
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versation he was a lawyer in Paris specializing in "noble cases" (p. 17)
- cases involving widows, orphans, and alleged murderers. He was,
he claims, "truly above reproach in [his] professional life" (p. 19) and,
more generally, one of the happy few who are born knowing how to
live (p. 27). As such, he evaded all unfavorable judgment: "You
would really have thought that justice slept with me every night. I am
sure you would have admired the rightness of my tone, the appropri
ateness of my emotion, the persuasion and warmth, the restrained in
dignation of my speeches before the court" (p. 17). Judgment was al
"The judges punished and the
ways directed toward others:
defendants expiated, while I, free of any duty, shielded from judgment
as from penalty, freely held sway bathed in a light as of Eden" (p.27).
Yet Clamence sees in hindsight that his Eden always contained the
seeds of its own dissolution. First, he comes to recognize the sinister
aspect of his appetite for good deeds. That aspect is evident even in a
simple recitation of his incommensurate emotional responses to such
acts: Clamence describes his love of helping blind people across the
street (p. 20), his exultation at the approach of a beggar (p. 21), and
his joy at driving strangers home during transportation strikes (p. 22).
But Clamence only gradually comes to identify the problem: that he
gives not out of altruism but to demonstrate his own superiority. He
recognizes that he has always "needed to feel above" (p.23). This is a
literal need - when Clamence says that he has "never felt comfort
able except in lofty places," he means that he prefers "the bus to the
subway, open carriages to taxis, terraces to closed-in places" (p. 23).
Yet it is not only a literal need, for as Clamence notes, his "profession
satisfied most happily that vocation for summits" (p.25). And at least
in its figurative manifestation, the need for heights calls his altruism
into question. Clamence's virtue ostensibly permits him to attain
"more than the vulgar ambitious man" and to ascend "to that supreme
summit where virtue is its own reward" (p. 23). But is virtue truly its
own reward if the virtuous man takes so much pleasure in surpassing
the vulgar ambitious one? Clamence comes to answer this question in
the negative - "When I was concerned with others, I was so out of
pure condescension ..." (p.48).
Clamence also believed in his own perfection because of his unme
diated access to life- "wasn't that Eden, cher monsieur: no interme
diary between life and me?" (p. 27). That aspect of Eden, too, is ulti
mately interrogated. Clamence arrives at the insight that his
relationship to his life is mediated through forgetting- "I had always
been aided by an extraordinary ability to forget. I used to forget
everything, beginning with my resolutions" (p. 49). He cannot re
member the issues that are ostensibly so important to him: "Funda
mentally, nothing mattered. War, suicide, love, poverty got my atten
tion, of course, when circumstances forced me, but a courteous,
superficial attention . . . . Everything slid off- yes, just rolled off me"
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(p. 49). Yet he does not forget quite everything. The only thing that
he remembers - the only thing that provides coherence - is himself:
"I lived consequently without any other continuity than that, from day
to day, of I, I, I" (p. 50). The selectivity of his memory thus again sug
gests his narcissism.
If Clamence's forgetfulness reflects his narcissism, it also reinforces
it.
Clamence's conception of himself as perfect is secured only
through the elision of uncomfortable details. His "fall" from Eden
therefore occurs as he begins to remember. In describing the primary
catalyst for the return of his memory, Clamence speaks of an evening
he spent gazing at the river from the Pont des Arts. He was filled with
well-being: "I felt rising within me a vast feeling of power and - I
don't know how to express it - of completion, which cheered my
heart" (pp. 38-39). Then he heard laughter behind him, traveling
downstream as if emanating from a boat (p. 39). His heart began to
beat rapidly, although "there was nothing mysterious about that laugh;
it was a good, hearty, almost friendly laugh" (p. 39). He walked home,
feeling dazed, breathing with difficulty, and buying cigarettes he did
not need (p. 39). At home, he heard laughter again from the street,
opened the windows, and saw some youths saying goodnight. "I went
into the bathroom to drink a glass of water. My reflection was smiling
in the mirror, but it seemed to me that my smile was double . " (p.
.

.

40).
When he initially tells the story, Clamence does not reveal why the
laughter disturbed him so much. Laughter can imply ridicule and
judgment, to which Clamence would clearly be sensitive, but the
laughter was so innocuous, and had so little to do with him, that some
thing else was obviously in play. But we are forced to wait, as
Clamence himself may have been forced to wait, for the resurfacing of
the memory that freighted the laughter with such significance. It is
only later, in the middle of the novel, that Clamence divulges it.
The earlier memory is one of crossing the river on a different
bridge on a night two or three years before the night on the Pont des
Arts (p. 69). One of the few people in view was a thin young woman
dressed in black, leaning over the railing of the bridge. The nape of
her neck caught Clamence's erotic attention. But only momentarily
he passed on (pp. 69-70). When he had walked fifty yards, he heard
the sound of a body striking the water, and then "a cry, repeated sev
eral times, which was going downstream" (p. 70). The sound then
suddenly stopped. Clamence froze. "I wanted to run and yet didn't
stir. I was trembling, I believe from cold and shock. I told myself that
I had to be quick and I felt an irresistible weakness steal over me. I
have forgotten what I thought then" (p. 70). Finally, he made a deci
sion. "Then, slowly under the rain, I went away. I informed no one"
(p. 70). Over the next few days, he did not read the papers.
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The laughter on the Pont des Arts presumably stirred up this ear
lier repressed memory because of similarities in the setting, the time,
and the sound of a human voice getting fainter as it traveled down
stream. That sound, however, had changed from a cry of anguish to
laughter. It is easy to read that laughter, and easy to think Clamence
read it, as laughter about his hypocrisy. Clamence's twin flaws of self
absorption and forgetfulness are simultaneously indicted - to pre
serve his narcissistic belief in his own perfection, he actively sought to
forget the incident and his feelings about it.
Once this memory surfaces, Clamence radically revises his entire
self-conception. Clamence maintains that the moment an individual
opens himself to negative judgment, there is no stopping point - "We
are forced to take the same precautions as the animal tamer. If, be
fore going into the cage, he has the misfortune to cut himself while
shaving, what a feast for the wild animals!" (p. 77). Clamence casts his
friends in the roles of the animals, who come to ravening judgment at
the slightest show of weakness (p. 78). Yet it is clear that he is his own
harshest judge. Under his relentless self-scrutiny, memory begets
memory, and confession begets confession. Clamence confesses to the
brutal betrayal of a mistress (pp. 63-65), to cowardice when his honor
is insulted (pp. 51-53), and to more daily forms of pettiness (p. 85).
Besides not going to the drowning woman's aid, Clamence's greatest
sin occurs while he is interned in a German camp in Tunisia during the
war: "Let's just say I closed the circle when I drank the water of a
dying comrade" (p. 126). The events on the evening at the Pont des
Arts were thus evocative of his two greatest sins - he heard the voice
moving down the river, then returned to his home and drank a glass of
water. It is thus unsurprising that, as we will see, water becomes an
important trope for the guilty conscience throughout Clamence's con
fessional narrative.
After accepting his own guilt, Clamence becomes unable to carry
on the profession of a lawyer. Fleeing to Amsterdam, he assumes the
name of Jean-Baptiste Clamence (pp. 8, 17).10 The name is reminis
cent of John the Baptist, the last prophet "clamans in deserto."11 That

10. Clamence divulges early in the novel that he is using a pseudonym (p. 17) and re
minds us of this fact again (p. 125). He never reveals his real name.
11. See BROOKS, supra note 3, at 165; JONES, supra note 3, at 58. Qamence makes re
peated references to himself as a prophet in the wilderness. He observes: "In solitude and
when fatigued, one is after all inclined to take oneself for a prophet. When all is said and
done, that's really what I am, having taken refuge in a desert of stones, fogs, and stagnant
waters - an empty prophet for shabby times ..." (p. 117). Similarly, after describing how
he "made up [his] mind to leave the society of men," Clamence says, "No, no, I didn't look
for a desert island; there are no more" (p. 98). While Qamence at one point compares him
self to Elijah (p. 117), it is clear that he most identifies with John the Baptist. Jones notes
parallels between Clamence and John the Baptist other than their shared name. For exam
ple, Clamence, like the Baptist clothed in his camel's hair, wears a camel-hair coat (p. 9). See
JONES, supra note 3, at 65. Similarly, Clamence pictures his own death as one in which his
head is displayed to the people (p. 146), as was the Baptist's own head. See id.
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association is developed by Clamence himself, who speaks of "the bit
ter water of [his] baptism" (p. 108), which presumably refers to his
baptism into the consciousness of his own guilt. We might initially in
terpret his rejection of the legal profession as arising from a fear of
hypocrisy: How can Clamence, who is culpable himself, participate in
decisions about the guilt or innocence of others? That interpretation
finds support in Clamence's repeated comments about how he will
never be able to evade his own guilt. Building on the symbolic link be
tween water and guilty conscience, Clamence stresses the inescapable
nature of each. Boating on the Zuider Zee, Clamence tells his inter
locutor that he now realizes that the cry of the drowned woman has
"never ceased, carried by the river to the waters of the Channel, to
travel throughout the world" (p. 108). He understands that it will wait
for him "on seas and rivers, everywhere, in short, where lies the bitter
water of my baptism" (p. 108). Longing to escape "this immense holy
water font," he asks whether it is "credible that [they should] ever
reach Amsterdam" (p. 109). Yet Amsterdam offers no escape from
the water of guilt - as Clamence observes at the novel's inception,
"Amsterdam's concentric canals resemble the circles of hell" (p.14).
In speaking of the inescapability of guilty conscience, however,
Clamence is not speaking only of his own personal predicament. His
self-conception as John the Baptist suggests that he has not only been
baptized himself, but that he also baptizes others into a consciousness
of guilt. That "bitter water" surrounds all who inhabit the atmosphere
of the novel. Clamence explains that "this country inspires [him]," in
part because water is so obviously ubiquitous - Holland's people are
"wedged into a little space of houses and canals, hemmed in by fogs,
cold lands, and the sea steaming like a wet wash" (p. 12). Moreover,
throughout the work, there is a "damned humidity" (p. 111) which
makes it "hard to breathe; the air is so heavy it weighs on one's chest"
(p. 43). There is also constant rain (p. 12), which only lets up to be
come snow. The transformation delights Clamence, as he thinks of the
snow as the feathers of doves flying over Amsterdam.12 The change
from the transparency of water to the opacity of snow is a momentary
return from the lucid knowledge of guilt to the blank forgetfulness of
innocence. But it is, of course, a transient metamorphosis, and one
that is always ultimately reversed (p. 145). In the end, Clamence con
cludes that "we cannot assert the innocence of anyone, whereas we
can state with certainty the guilt of all" (p. 110). Clamence's rejection
of the lawyer's traditional role thus does not arise out of a simple

12. P. 145. Earlier in the novel, Clamence makes cryptic references to millions of invisi
ble doves flying over Amsterdam (pp. 73, 96). As Lucy Melbourne suggests, the doves recall
the dove that descended to mark Christ as the Redeemer at the time of his baptism. See
LUCY L. MELBOURNE, DOUBLE HEART 175 (1986). As the feathers of the doves descend
upon all, they may be read as announcing the innocence and divinity of all.
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sense of personal disqualification. He believes that no one is innocent
enough to perform that role.
Clamence's conclusion that all are guilty again both reflects and
reinforces his narcissism. Clamence's acknowledgement of his own
guilt might be seen as a repudiation of his old hubris. But Clamence's
transcendence over his old self is only partial, as he relinquishes the
idea of his perfection but not of his superiority. We can see this in the
quickness of his move from the belief that he is guilty to the belief that
all are guilty. In this implicit logic - that if even he is guilty, all must
be guilty - we see something of the old Clamence's narcissism.
Moreover, Clamence's belief in universal guilt actually reinforces his
belief in his own superiority, for while all are guilty, only some are
honest enough to confess their guilt. By doing penance, Clamence
achieves the moral superiority that permits him to judge his fellow
human beings. For Clamence is now not simply a penitent, but a
judge-penitent (p. 8) - he is not only a confessant, but also a confes
sor. Indeed, he sees the two roles as inextricably linked. He notes
that ordinary people judge others to protect themselves: "People has
ten to judge in order not to be judged themselves" (p. 80). Clamence,
on the other hand, once again aims to surpass the "vulgar ambitious
man" (p. 23). He seeks "to travel the road in the opposite direction
and practice the profession of penitent to be able to end up as a judge"
(p.138).
The doubleness of Clamence's role shifts in signification in his
mind from an avoidable hypocrisy to a necessary one. Clamence
originally speaks of his doubled nature with some derision, speaking of
his sign as that of "a double face, a charming Janus" (p. 47), expressing
disquiet at his "double" smile, and saying that he lived his whole life
under "a double code" (p. 88). But he ultimately comes to peace with
his double role - "I have accepted duplicity instead of being upset
about it. On the contrary, I have settled into it and found there the
comfort I was looking for throughout life" (p. 141). The double role is
necessitated by the two sides of confession - there must be one to
hear, and one to speak. But because of the universality of guilt, all
must assume both roles. This is the urbane view of confession into
which Clamence baptizes us.
III.
After embracing the urbane view of confessions, Clamence leaves
the law. This is unsurprising, as the law seems uncongenial to the view
that confessions demonstrate the guilt of us all. To the contrary, legal
confessions are meant to demonstrate the guilt only of the individual
who is making the confession. Indeed, the confession is seen today, as
in the medieval period, as the "queen of proofs," the dispositive mark
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of individual guilt.13 Thus, those who would wholly embrace the ur
bane view will not be comfortable within legal discourse.
Not all who embrace the urbane view, however, have the ability or
inclination to leave the law. For us, the question remains of how to
reconcile the legal understanding of the confession with a more ur
bane cultural one. In answering this question, I advert to Peter
Brooks's new book on confessions in law and literature.14 This exem
plary work contextualizes the legal confession within the broader cul
tural practice of confession, not only as it is conducted in literature,
but also as it is conducted in religion and psychoanalysis. By doing so,
it illuminates the necessary reductions that law must make to other
cultural understandings of confessions in order to function as "the
law."
Brooks posits that the legal treatment of confessions is, in many
ways, an outlier from their treatment in broader culture.15 This thesis
certainly holds with regard to the urbane view, which is much more
robustly represented in the literary, psychoanalytic, and religious con
texts than in the legal one. We have already seen in the literary realm
that Clamence shifts from confessant to confessor. We can also situate
Camus's novel within a long literary tradition - extending from The
Canterbury Tales16 to The Crucible11 - in which the lines between con
fessants and confessors are blurred.
In the religious realm, the
Catholic tradition has required annual confession of the faithful since

1215, which means that priests taking confessions must also make
them.18 Finally, in the psychoanalytic realm, concerns about the trans
ferential dynamic have led to the requirement that psychoanalysts un
dergo analysis as part of their training.19 In each of these realms, it is
recognized that everyone has something to confess, something to work
through, something about which he feels, or should feel, guilty.20
13. See BROOKS, supra note 3, at 4. Legal commentators have emphasized that confes
sions play a crucial role in securing guilty convictions in crinrinal trials. See, e.g., Paul G.
Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 387, 435-36
(1996) (collecting commentary).
14. See generally BROOKS, supra note 3.
15. See id. at 4-5.
16. GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY
1400).

TALES

(Nevill Coghill trans., 1986) (c.

17. ARTHUR MILLER, THE CRUCIBLE (1953).
18. See LEON-JOSEPH CARDINAL SUENENS, CORESPONSIBILITY IN THE CHuRCH 10809, 118 (Francis Martin trans., 1968).
19. See 1 RALPH R. GREENSON, THE TECHNIQUE AND P�CTICE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
364-65 (1967).
20. As I have learned from considering confessions in my law-and-literature class, the
term "confessant" (the individual making the confession) and the term "confessor" (the in
dividual listening to the confession) are easily mistaken for each other. I believe that this
confusion arises not only out of the similarity between the two words, but also out of the
sinillarity between the two roles.
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In its rejection of the urbane view, the law emerges as the excep
tion rather than the rule. Because the law must make ultimate deci
sions about guilt and innocence, it does not have the same institutional
license as literature, religion, or psychoanalysis to let confessions
demonstrate the universality of guilt.21 Rather, it must promulgate the
view that confessions may, at least in some circumstances, stand as the
definitive utterance of individual guilt. This is why Clamence's profes
sion of judge-penitent sounds so paradoxical: in Shakespeare's cele
brated words, "to offend and judge are distinct offices, [a]nd of op
posed natures."22 To distinguish this conception of particularized guilt
from the urbane one, I will call it the "pragmatic conception."
Because law may never be entirely unmoored from culture, how
ever, the pragmatic conception will always have to reckon with the
pull of the urbane one.23 Indeed, the urbane view often appears to be
a better description of how confessions work, even in the law.
Camus's profession of "judge-penitent" seems paradoxical, but it is
surely no surprise that legal confessors may also have sins of their own
to confess. While there are many such sins, I will focus in the remain
der of this discussion on perhaps the most infamous one. This is the
sin of coercing the confession from the confessant. When such coer
cion exists, the confession may speak less to the suspect's guilt in
committing a crime than to the interrogator's guilt in extorting the
confession. Guilt in the legal realm can thus be as transitive and as
ambiguous as guilt in the literary one. We might say that the urbane
conception is not so much absent in the law as repressed by it.
American constitutional law is thus faced with a dilemma - how
does it recognize the accuracy of the urbane conception but still sus
tain the viability of the pragmatic one? The jurisprudence concerning
the admissibility of confessions may be read as an attempt to give each
conception its due.24 The urbane view is represented in the fact that

21. See BROOKS, supra note 3, at 4-5.
22. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2,
Russell Brown ed., 7th ed., Methuen & Co. 1959).

SC.

9, 11. 61-62 (John

23. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (noting that the Jaw is "but a small part of the nor
mative universe that ought to claim our attention," and therefore cannot be understood in
isolation "from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning").
24. The Supreme Court has relied on a number of separate constitutional provisions to
determine the admissibility of confessions:
(1) From 1936 to the present, the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments have been used to exclude involuntary confessions.
(2) From 1964 to the present, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been applied
in determining the admissibility of a confession obtained from a defendant who has
been formally charged with a crime.
(3) Since 1966, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination has been
applied to statements made during custodial interrogation; a waiver analysis has
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courts have entertained the possibility that the suspect's confession
may not (only) represent the guilt of the suspect, but may (also) repre
sent the guilt of the interrogator.25 The pragmatic view is represented
in the fact that the courts entertain that ambiguity only to resolve it if admitted, the confession is always held to redound to the guilt only
of the suspect, rather than testifying to the guilt of both parties (or the
guilt of us all). Thus, the jurisprudence of confessions recognizes the
urbane view, but ultimately reduces it to the pragmatic one. I wish to
suggest that the various phases of the jurisprudence regulating confes
sions - the pre-Miranda phase, the Miranda phase, and the proposed
post-Miranda phases - may all be seen as different approaches to this
reduction.26
Until shortly before the landmark Miranda decision in 1966, the
question of whether the confession testified to the guilt of the suspect
or to the guilt of the interrogator was framed almost exclusively as a
question of voluntariness under the due process clauses.27 Voluntari
ness was not determined formulaically, but rather by looking at "the
totality of all the surrounding circumstances."28 If the suspect con
fessed "voluntarily," then the confession was admissible as the ulti
mate proof of the suspect's guilt. If the suspect did not confess volun
tarily, then the confession was inadmissible.
The voluntary/
involuntary distinction was thus used to counter the transitive nature
of confessions, assigning entire responsibility for the confession to one
party or the other.
The voluntariness standard, however, merely displaced the inde
terminacy inhering in the practice of confession onto the analogous
indeterminacy inhering in the concept of agency. Thus, it was unsur-

prevailed, and the privilege must be shown to have been effectively waived before a
confession is admissible.
See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIELJ.

CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 511

{5th ed. 1996).
25. See infra notes 27-55 and accompanying text.
26. I acknowledge that these distinctions are very rough, insofar as significant changes
that occurred within each of these phases will go largely unattended here. See, e.g., Richard
A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators' Strategies ofDealing
with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 407 {1999) (noting that
"Miranda itself has changed" over the "past thirty-three years," such that it "is no longer one
case, but rather a body of safeguards that impose less strict safeguards than the original deci
sion").
27. The first Fourteenth Amendment coerced confession case was Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936), in which the Supreme Court excluded a confession as involuntary. The
Supreme Court decided thirty-five "voluntariness" cases between 1936 and 1964. In these
cases, the Court determined on a case-by-case basis how the voluntariness of a confession
was affected by such factors as the personal characteristics of the accused, circumstances of
physical deprivation or mistreatment, and psychological influences. See SALTZBURG &
CAPRA, supra note 24, at 512-14.
28. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
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prising that the more subtly the pre-Miranda opinions addressed the
question of volition, the more they approached the urbane view. In
the 1944 case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee,29 Justice Jackson wrote in dis
sent that "[t]o speak of any confessions of crime made after arrest as
being 'voluntary' or 'uncoerced' is somewhat inaccurate, although tra
ditional."30 This is because "[i]t is probably the normal instinct to deny
and conceal any shameful or guilty act."31 Jackson thus pointed out
that the mere fact that the confession was made suggests that the con
fessant's will was overborne.
This analysis is consonant with
Clamence's teaching that all confessions are effectively co-written by
confessant and confessor.
To the extent that the voluntariness standard tacks close to the ur
bane view, we should expect it to be unworkable. Brooks focuses on
Culombe v. Connecticut,32 one of the major cases leading up to
Miranda, to make the point that sophistication in this realm can be
impractical.33 In Culombe, Justice Frankfurter wrote a sixty-seven
page "treatise" on the voluntariness standard, which sets forth a three
part test. The courts are to determine "the crude historical facts,"
then to engage in the "imaginative recreation, largely inferential, of
internal, 'psychological' fact," and finally to apply "to this psychologi
cal fact . . . standards for judgment informed by the larger legal con
ceptions ordinarily characterized as rules of law but which, also, com
prehend both induction from, and anticipation of, factual
circumstances."34 Merely articulating this version of the test should
vindicate Justice Warren's criticism in his Culombe concurrence that
lower courts and law enforcement agencies would receive little guid
ance "from the treatise for which this case seems to have provided a
vehicle."35 In 1985, the Court offered a retrospective of scholarly cri
tiques of the voluntariness test, noting that "[t]he voluntariness rubric
has been variously condemned as 'useless,' 'perplexing,' and 'legal
'double-talk.' "36 "Voluntariness" was thus a false rescue from the ur
bane view of confession.
Because of the incoherence of the voluntariness standard, it
" 'seemed inevitable that the Court would seek 'some automatic de
vice by which the potential evils of incommunicado interrogation

29. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
30. Id. at 161 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 160 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
32. 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
33. See BROOKS, supra note 3, at 65-87.
34. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 603 (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion).
35. Id. at 656 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
36. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 n.4 (1985) (citations omitted) (collecting com
mentary).
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[could] be controlled.' ' "37 Five years after Culombe, the Court found
its automatic device in Miranda v. Arizona.38 The holding of Miranda
was that the famous four-part warning (or a legislatively written
equivalent) had to be recited for a confession to be deemed volun
tary.39 Yet it was entirely predictable that the warning would shift
from being a quasi-necessary condition40 for the admissibility of a con
fession to becoming a quasi-sufficient one.41 The rule's distinction be
tween warning and nonwarning tracks the desired distinction between
volition and coercion so closely that it is unsurprising that legal actors
often intuit a close correlation between them.42 And, relative to volun
tariness, the presence or absence of the Miranda warning is easily veri
fiable - it is not an interior state, but a public utterance.

Miranda thus successfully disrupts the dynamic described by the
urbane view of confessions. The urbane view suggests that confessions
describe a guilt beyond that of the speaker, provoking a counter
confession by the individual who hears the confession regarding his
own guilt. Reading the criminal confession into this paradigm con
jures up the image of a police officer forcing a confession from a sus
pect, and then being required in a pre-Miranda voluntariness inquiry
to confess his own bad deeds in extorting the confession.43
In

37. YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 458 (8th ed. 1994) (al
teration in original) (quoting Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court,
1977 SUP. Cr. REV. 99, 103 (quoting WALTER v. SCHAFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND CONVERGING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 10 (1967))).
38. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39. The four warnings are: (1) that the suspect has the right to remain silent; (2) that
any statements he makes can be used against him; (3) that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney during questioning; and (4) that he will be provided with an attorney if he can
not afford one. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
40. Cases following Miranda have narrowed its protections such that the warning is not
strictly necessary to use the confession in certain ways. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (creating a general "public safety" exception to Miranda); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 433 (1974) (holding admissible the testimony of a witness whose iden
tity had been learned by questioning the defendant without a full Miranda warning); Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 222 (1971) (holding that statements obtained without a full
Miranda warning may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility).
41. The Miranda warning does not exempt police officers from further scrutiny as to the
voluntariness of the confession. See KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 37, at 458 n.c. The warn
ing, however, has been described as providing them with a "safe harbor." See CHARLES
FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION:
A FIRST-HAND
ACCOUNT 45 (1991) (noting author's impression as Solicitor General that "most professional

law enforcement organizations had learned to live with Miranda, and even to love it, to the
extent that it provided them with a safe harbor").
42 See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 123
(1998) (arguing that Miranda created an isomorphism between warning/nonwarning and vo
lition/coercion).
43. In contrast to the literary model, of course, the compulsion on the part of the inter
rogator to confess his bad deeds will usually not be internal. Rather, that compulsion will
come from the legal proceedings themselves. Yet the very fact that those proceedings direct
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Camusian fashion, the original confessor becomes the confessant. Af
ter Miranda, however, the link between the suspect's confession and
the officer's confession is broken. So long as the police officer is
canny enough to mouth the words of the Miranda warning, the sus
pect's subsequent confession is much more likely to be deemed volun
tary, and the police officer's own acts may go unconfessed.
In this sense, the Miranda warning may be seen as a form of anti
confession, a circuit breaker that disrupts the generativity of the con
fession. This is true not only for the officer, who can be protected by
the warning from many forms of subsequent scrutiny, but also for the
suspect. For the suspect, the warning by itself is unlikely to prompt the
suspect to make a confession. This is because it formalizes the rela
tionship between officer and suspect. A set text that reveals nothing
about its individual speaker, it informs the suspect of his substantive
rights. This has the effect of reminding the suspect that the officer is
not a sympathetic confessor, and that the legal modality of confession
is in this way an outlier from many other models of confession extant
in our culture. It also prevents the officer from entirely tailoring his
narrative to the individual suspect in a Clamence-like manner. Think
how much less likely the stranger of The Fall would have been to
make his confession if Clamence had administered the warning at the
beginning of his artful narrative! Conversely, think of the cases in
which suspects are encouraged to make confessions because the inter
rogator tells exactly this kind of a narrative.44
In this Term's Dickerson v. United States,45 the Supreme Court pre
served the Miranda framework from a 1968 Congressional statute that
sought to reinstate the pre-Miranda status quo.46 In reaching its result,
the Court first had to determine whether Miranda had announced a
constitutional rule, which Congress could not supersede, or a noncon
stitutional rule, which Congress could alter at will.47 After deciding
themselves at the potential guilt of the interlocutor suggests that the confessional scene is
being read through the urbane paradigm.

44. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 {1977). In Brewer, a police officer drove a
man suspected of murdering a ten-year-old girl from Davenport, Iowa to Des Moines with
the understanding that the suspect would not be questioned until he met with his lawyer at
his destination. See id. at 390-91. While the officer did not ask the suspect any questions, he
told a vivid narrative about how the heavy snow forecasted for that evening would cover the
body of the girl by the time they reached their destination. See id. at 392. The officer went
on to suggest that the suspect, whom he knew to be deeply religious, was the only individual
who could enable the parents to find the girl in time to give her a Christian burial. See id. at
393. The suspect broke down and led the officer to the body. See id. The Supreme Court
found that this process had violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
noting that the detective's narrative sought "to elicit information from [the suspect] just as
surely as - and perhaps more effectively than
if he had formally interrogated him." Id.
at 399.
-

45. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000).
46. 18 u.s.c. § 3501 (1994).
47. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2332-33.
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that the Miranda framework had a constitutional dimension, the Court
then considered whether the statute actually sought to supersede that
framework. This question was slightly complicated by the fact that
Miranda itself accorded Congress and state legislatures some power to
develop alternatives to its four-part warning. Miranda stated that its
framework was not intended to be a "constitutional straitjacket"48 and
that its holding permitted legislatures to replace the warning with
"procedures which are at least as effective."49 The Dickerson Court
quickly dispensed with this potential complication by observing that
the statute sought to reinstate the framework that pre-dated Miranda,
in which a judicial finding of voluntariness in light of the totality of the
circumstances was not only necessary, but also sufficient, to render a
confession admissible.50 Reasoning that the Miranda Court had al
ready rejected this framework as constitutionally inadequate, the
Dickerson Court struck down the statute.51
It bears emphasis that the Dickerson Court did not hold that the
words of the Miranda warning were constitutionally required.
Dickerson did not overrule the portion of Miranda that suggested that
its constitutional requirement could be satisfied by "procedures which
are at least as effective" as the four-part warning. It simply noted that
the pre-Miranda voluntariness paradigm did not provide such a proce
dure. Thus, while Dickerson bars a return to the pre-Miranda regime,
it theoretically permits an advance to some third regime in which the
warning is retired.52
But while the Dickerson Court did not formally require the words
of the warning, it strongly suggested that they are here to stay. To
ward the end of its opinion, the Court noted that the doctrine of stare
decisis also supported its holding. It stated: "Whether or not we
would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we
addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis
weigh heavily against overruling it now."53 As part of that analysis, the
Court described the reliance interest that had developed around the
words of the warning, stating that "Miranda has become embedded in

48. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
49. Id.
50. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at2335.
51. Id.
52. Academic commentators have suggested alternatives to the Miranda warning other
than the voluntariness paradigm. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Ren e- B. Lettow, Fifth
Amendment - First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 909
(1995) (suggesting, inter alia, "a prophylactic rule that no police-station confession by a de
fendant is ever allowed in, unless volunteered by a suspect in the presence of an on-duty de
fense lawyer or ombudsman in the police station"); Cassell, supra note 13, at 496-97 (sug
gesting, inter alia that a modified warning be given that eliminates the offer of counsel, and
that confessions be videotaped).
53. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
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routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become
part of our national culture."54 Literary scholars have posited that
Shakespeare named his Miranda to draw on the name's associations to
the words "admiration" and "wonder."55 The Court's stare decisis
analysis maintained that whether we admire the Miranda warning or
not, we should give weight to the fact that its uptake in our culture has
been wondrous.
What the Court implied, then, is that the longevity of the Miranda
warning may be less assured by the Constitution (which does not re
quire the words of the warning) than by the warning's status as a cul
tural icon.56 Elaine Scarry elegantly observes that "[s]ometimes it may
even happen that a just legal principle has the good fortune to be for
mulated in a sentence whose sensory features reinforce the availability
of the principle to perception."57 While she focuses on the opening
cadences of the Declaration of Independence as her example,58 the
Miranda warning also bears out her claim. This easily memorized
quatrain has been immensely successful in making our constitutional
rights available to perception: It has been observed that "[s]chool
children are more likely to recognize Miranda warnings than the
Gettysburg Address."59 Indeed, the Miranda warning might make us
wonder why we do not frame more of our laws in a form that would
facilitate their dissemination. If this seems fanciful, recall that the
Greeks deliberately embodied law-like mores in poetry to ensure their
broad dissemination in a primarily oral culture.60 As a popular poem
that serves as a legal mnemonic, the Miranda warning can be read as a
serendipitous throwback to this tradition. And while the Court obvi
ously did not endorse such a practice, it did recognize that deference
was due to formulations of legal rules that had found broad uptake in

54. Id.
55. When Ferdinand first learns Miranda's name in The Tempest, he calls her "Admir'd
Miranda! I Indeed the top of admiration! worth I what's dearest to the world." WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 3, sc. 1, II. 37-39 (Frank Kermode ed., 6th ed. Harvard
Univ. Press 1958). In his annotation to this passage, Frank Kermode notes that "[h]ere
Shakespeare plays upon the name he has invented for his last heroine." Id. at 74. In his
commentary to a different edition, Robert Langbaum points out that in Latin, "Miranda"
means "wonderful." See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST 83 (Robert Langbaum
ed., Signet Classic 1964).
56. Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, OK, All Together Now: "You Have the Right to . . ,"L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, at Ml, M6 (contending, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Dickerson, that because of the popularization of the Miranda warning through television, the
warning is "here to stay, in our heads if not our lawbooks").
.

57. ELAINE SCARRY, ON BEAUTY 102 (1999).
58. See id.

at 102-03.

59. THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POLICING xv (Richard A. Leo &
George C. Thomas III eds., 1998).
60. See M. ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
LAW 25-27 (1989).
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the culture. Once such uptake is taken into account, we might ask
whether any alternative could be "at least as effective" as the warning.
Here an ironic conclusion leaps to the eye of the law-and-literature
scholar. One truism in the law-and-literature field is that law is coer
cive, while literature is merely persuasive.61 In the context of confes
sions, however, literature appears to wield greater force than the law
in at least two ways. First, it is the literary (or more broadly, the cul
tural) conception of the confession - in which the confession gener
ates more and more guilt - that the law is desperately, and oftentimes
unsuccessfully, attempting to cabin. Second, the most successful way
to date in which the law has been able to restrain the literary fecundity
of the confession has been through the Miranda warning, which is it
self a kind of literary form - a poem. The j urisprudence of confes
sions, then, doubly inverts the traditional hierarchy of law over litera
ture. The great literary power of the confession is being tamed by the
great literary power of the Miranda warning. One literary form has
generated another in a way of which even the urbane Clamence might
approve.

61. See, e.g.,
(1986).
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